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Financial reforms in forrnerly centrally planned  Hungary has made substantial progress, they
economies take a different form than in market  conclude, but macrofinancial indicators suggest
economies because they imply not only liberaliz-  thai administrative and technical obstacles
ing the system but also reshaping the structure  remain and that supporting measures must be
and functioning of financial markets.  And the  deepened.  Four steps in particular are needed:
reforms must be designed to facilitate the
conduct of monetary policy under rapidly  c  The ability of the monetary authority to
changing economic circumstances. To fulfill  conduct monetary polic) must be enhanced.
this role, financial reforms should (1) provide the
authorities with monetary policy instruments that  * The operating and financial condition of
contribute to short-term stabilization and (2)  financial intemiediaries must be improved.
provide the incentives for inducing a more
efficient intermediation of savings through the  *  Healthy competition among financial
financial markets.  intermediaries must be encouraged.
In uhis  context, Blejer and Sagari identify the  *  A prudential regulatory framework that does
main tasks and targets of financial reform and  not discriminate against the development of a
comment on the key developments of the Hlun-  securities market must be established.
_arian process.
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The economic  reforms  that are  under  way in  many centrally  planned economies
(CPEs)  are part of a general process of social and political restructuring.  As
such: they cannot be analyzed in isolation; their aims and achievements must be
assessed in the broad context of wide systemic changes.  Nevertheless, it is
possible to  focus on specific areas of the  reforms and  to examine  (i) the
objectives set for these areas, (ii)  the design of specific policies within the
framework of  these objectives, and  (iii) the achievements and the  required
conditions for the successful implementation of the policies.
I.  The Framework
The central  goal  of  economic reforms is  to  establish  a system  that responds
to market  forces and is therefore more efficient and dynamic.  To this end,
economic decision making should be decentralized, and economic agents should  be
allowed to freely dispose of their profits, as well as be accountable for the
losses arising from their economic management decisions.
As economic units become more independent, behaving and reacting as they
would  in a competitive  environment, the nature  of macroeconomic management
changes  substantially: more  emphasis has  to be  given  to  incentives  and to
indirect levers that manage  and regulate the behavior of the  increasingly
autonomous  economic agents 'nd  less  attention should  be placed on administrative
controls.  Under the strict central planning system prevailing before reform,
IMF and World Bank, respectively.macroeconomic  policy  allocates--administratively--resourceB  and  regulates
directly  the  rate  of  capitl2  accumulation.  This  is  largely  achieved  by
maintaining family income levels within the constraints set by the envisaged
supply  cf  consumer goods. With the implementation  of the reforms,  market signals
will guide economic agents.  Macroeconomic policy will then need to adapt in
order  to  influence  indirectly  individuals' behavior  with  the  objective  of
achieving  government targets,  such  as  growth  and  investment  levels, while
avoiding imbalances  and thus preserving stability.  -iven  the central role that
financial and monetary policies play in the macroeconomic context, the nature
and characteristics  of  financial reforms--which set the  stage  for monetary
management--should be carefully analyzed.
Financial reforms in CPEs take a different form than in market economies
because they  imply not  only liberalizing the  system but  also reshaping the
structure and functioning of financial markets.  In addition, the reforms must
be designed  in a way that  facilitates the conduct of monetary policy under
rapidly  changing  economic circumstances. To fulfill  this role,  financial  reforms
should  (i) provide  the  authorities  with  monetary  policy  instruments  that
contribute  to  the  short-term  stabilization  process,  and  (ii) provide  the
incentives for inducing a more efficient intermediation  of savings throl!Jh  the
financial  marke..s.
Prior to  the  reforms, under  strict Soviet-type central  planning, the
banking  sector  was  totally centralized  and  monetary  policy  was simply  implemented
through a dual-payment system:  a credit plan and a cash plan.  Credit was
extended es,entially to supply working  (and in some cases investment) capital
to the enterprise sector.  The cash  plan, on the other hand,  covered the various
components of the short-run demand for liquidity in the system, for instance,payments of wages.  In fact, however, the Central Bank had little control over
most of the factors affecting the amount of currency in the economy, which was
decided by the planning authority.
At the inception of the reforms, the monetary and the financial systems
of the CPEs needed to be substantially restructured.  First, as mentioned, it
is necessary to provide instruments for indirect  monetary control.  This could
enable the authorities to manage macroeconomic aggregates more efftciently and
depend less  on intervention in  micro-level decision-making (which  would in turn
go  against  the  Ispirit' of  the  reforms  in  terms of  enterprise  autonomy.)
Instruments for this purpose were not available.  Second, since rrorn  liquidity
and financial resources  will be left for free  disposal by both  the household ard
the enterprise sectors, instruments that can channel surplus funds toward the
financial markets should be made available.  Third, since credit planning is
utilized to a lesser  degree, it is  important  to develop  decentralized mechanisms
so that credit  will be allocated efficiently amono  enterprises.  In particular,
as suppliers of funds to this sector, banks have an important role to play at
the  microeconcmic level,  allocatinc loans  on  the expectation  that the enterprise
will  be  profitable, and  consequently  raise  the  efficiency  of investment. Fourth,
since  the  intermediation  role  of  the  financial  market  will  increase,  an
institutional framework is  required that includes financial intermediaries  that
can supply all financial services required.  Such a framework should allow and
encourage competition in financial markets.  Fifth, in this ccntext, the role
of regulation must  be enhanced.  As  economic decisions become  increasingly
decentralized, the need becomes crucial for an adequate prudential regulatory
and supervisory framework that, without unduly restricting the operations of
financial intermediaries and capital markets, prevents excessive risk-taking.4
Omissiuns  in this area may lead to generalized financial chaos and crisis. 2
Six._h,  since f  ims  will be allowed and encouraged to finance their operations
through  different mixes of sources, securities and capital markets should  offer
a varietv of debt and eauitv options.
Clearly, all these different aspects are interrelated.  In this paper we
look at the case of Hungary in which such interrelations as well as the success
of  the  authorities  in  achieving  the  objectives  of  financial  reform  are
considered.  Section II  briefly review.  the macroeconomic environrmtent  in  Hungary
while Section III covers various aspects of the nature of reforms carried out.
Section IV provides an assessment  of the process, and Section V some  concluding
remarks.
II. Overview of Macroeconomic Developments since 1968
At the time of the worldwide economic shocks of the 1970s', Hungary was
pursuing expansionary growth policies.  To postpone any reduction or adjustment
of those policies, Hungary responded  to the shocks  by borrowing abroad. In 1981,
an  external financing  crisis  brought the strategy  to an  end.  Hungary sought  then
the  support of  the  IMF and  the World  Bank to  help  restore  its access to
international  financial  markets.  During 1982-84,  stabilization eclipsed  reform.
By 1984, macro-balances were restored, rescheduling had been avoided and, in
fact, Hungary  had  regained  its credit-worthiness in the  view  of the  world
financial  comnuunity.  The economy  appeared  to  have stabilized  successfully. But,
the turnaround came mainly from cuts in investment; it was not accompanied by
a comprehensive effort to address the structural sources of excess demand, low
2  And feed back quite strongly into any inflationary processes and fiscal
def'i.cits  existing in the economy.  For experiences in Latin America see, for
example, Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, 'Good-Bye  Financial Repression, Hello Financial
Crash', Journal of Development Economics, September-October 1985.5
productivity,  and  weak  external  competitiveness  of  industry.
Macroeconomic  imbalances  re3urfaced  in  1985-86.  While  the  deterioration
resulted  in  part  from  external  factors,  such  as  weakening  terms  of  trade  and
successive  droughts,  the  main  reason  was  the  premature  relaxation  cf
macroeconomic  co,.trols  on  aggr?gate  demand  (loose  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  and
inordinate  wage  increases).  The  major  economic  policy  problem  which  continued,
into  the  first  half  o.  1987,  was  the  persistence  of  fiscal  imbalances  stemming
from  the  sizable  budgetary  subsidies  and  from  other  financial  supports  to
inefficient  firms.  These  supports,  coupled  with  excessive  credit  availability,
maintained  the  high  level  of  domestic  demand.  By  early  1987,  the  authorities
instituted  a  series  of  measures  to  improve  export  incentives,  while  curbing
domestic  demand--in  particular  through  reducing  tho  budget  deficit.  These
measurets  succeeded  in  reversing  the  deteriorat-ion  in  internal  and  external
balances.
In  September  of  1987,  a  medium-~erm  program  for  stabilization  and
adjustment  was  adopted.  Main  components  of  the  program  were  a  reduction  of  the
fiscal  deficit,  a  comprehensive  tax  and  budgetary  refor  rgeted  to  decreasing
the  role  of  the  budget  in  the  process  of  resource  allocation,  and  reducing  the
scope  of  taxation,  a  curb  on  the  growth  of  credit  aggregates,  maintenance  of
positive  real  ir.terest  rates--especially  for  household  deposits--,  an  active
exchange  rate  policy  and  the  adoption  of  new  legislation  instituting  share-
holding  rights.3  Economic  performance  during  1988  and  1989  was  mixed;  the  main
problem  was  the  deterioration  of  the  fiscal  and  external  accounts.  New measures
were  implemented  towards  the  end  of  1989  to  address  this  deterioration,  most
notably  a  devaluation  of  the  forint  by  10%.  The  results  of  these  measure3  are
3  In  the  sense  of  Western  capitalist  economies6
still to be assessed.
III. Financial Sector Reform in Hungary
Though  the process  of reform  designed to increase  the  role of  market forces
in the Hungarian economy began in 1968, it  was dormant during the 1970s and it
was  only  by  the  mid-1980s  that  financial  sector  reform  was  officially
acknowledged  as  an  essential  component  of  that  process.  Following  the
decentralization of enterprise management in 1985, bankruptcy legislation was
enacted in 1986,  and, in 1987  the banking system  was decentralized.  Progressive
liberalization of pricing, wages, and foreign trade policies has been taking
place since.  Additionally, the tax system  has  been significantly simplified  and
its transparency improved  with the introduction  of the personal income tax, the
value added tax, and the enterprise profit tax.
A. The Pre-Reform Financial Sector
Nationalization occurreC in 19474. The financial system used thereafter,
up to 1968, was organized to meet the requirements of a conventional command
economy  characterized  by  centralized  decision  making  process,  with  plans
formulated in physical terms, and by enterprises having no available choices
regarding technology or markets and being mostly administratively directed.  In
such a systen,,  resource mobilization was done primarily by the state, through
fiscal mechanisms, by money creation, and by domestic and foreign borrowing.
Credit and money had no active role and banks had no say in allocations.  The
enterprise received only the credi.t  necessary for it to comply with production
plans.  Assessing  the  credit-worthiness  of  borrowing  ente-prises  was  not
important, since political guidelines  were that the lack of resources could not
4  Note than only Hungarian-owned shares were nEtionalized.7
hinder  planred  ecoromic  activity5 ,  and  firms  could  not  go  bankrupt.  This  was
made worse by the  fact that for a long period investment *loans* were non-
reimhursabLe and bore no interest.  In  this context, risk assumption was not an
issue,  and consequently  prudenttal  regulation  and supervision  were  unnecessary.
Financial  internediaries  were  limited to establishing  whether  the activity
to  be  financed  was  planned  or  not,  whether  it  h,'  physical  collateral,  and
whether the compan'v's  own funds were not suffic.ent.  Another function was the
financial  control of plan fulfillrmtnt.  Control  meant verifying  that the company
remained  w.thin the tight limits  of its  working capital,  wage-bill, labor-force
and inventories.  The characteristics of the system led also to (i) absolute
sectoral specialization of bank departments, since banks' inspectors had to
supervise  the  implementat_on  of  company  plans  formulated  in  kind  and  (ii)
specialization  by type  of  'lending'  since  working  capital  financing  and  deposit
collection were separated from investment financing.
As  in other  centrally  planned  economies,  from  an institutional  viewpoint,
the  pre-reform  financLal  sector  in Hangary  functioned  like a 'mono-bank,,  where
the  National  Bans  of Hun-ary  wa,  both  the monetary  authority  and the  commercial
bank  for the enterprise  sector.  The money  supply  was determined  fairly  directly
by  means  of  currencv  issue  anJ  the  control  of  credit  to  government  and  the
banking  lepartments.  Credilt.  contrcl  w-.  exercised  directly,  and  therefore  the
National  Bank  did  not  engage  in activities  such  as discounting  or open  market
operatLons.  Since  bank  liabilities  were  not  subject  to  reserve  requirements,
the limit to banks'  capacity  for credit  extension  was determined  by macroeconomic
5  Tamas  Bacskai,  'The  Recrganization  of  the  Banking  System',  The  New
Hungarian  Quarterlv.  Autumn  .987.  In  fact,  with  prices,  output,  and  input
determLned  by  the  central  planners,  profitability  indicators  do  not  mean  much
and  are  not  used  as criteria  for resource  allocation.8
decisions  made at  the central level  and incorporated in  financial  planu.  Credit
policy served as an important complement of  budgetary policy in the task of
achieving a macroeconomic balance between supply and demand.
The National Savings Bank  (NSB), in turn, and the associated system of
savings  cooperatives could  only and  exclusively  deal with individuals (including
small  economic  associates) at  rates  of interests  w'hich  became  highly subsidized. 6
In this system, the potential contribution of the pr.:rate  sector,  that is, of
household savings, to productive uses was  limited owing to the institutional
separation between the household and enterprise banking system.  Enterprises
became able to borrow directly from households through bond issues only in the
early 198Os, but then only to a small degree, as these issues were effectively
rationed  by  the availability  of a state  guarantee.  All th.s  had a clear negative
impact on the efficiency of the process of allocation of resources across the
economy.  Up  to  that  time  there  were  no  securLties  markets  or  equity
instruments.7,8
B. Key Developments in the Process of Financial Sector Reform
It  is now widely accepted in Hungary to achieve the objectives of the
overall economic reform change in the institutions, policies, and instruments
6  The system of housing finance, based on below-market interest rates on
credit and subsidized  rents in State-owned flat3,  created a situation  of chronic
excess demand for housing. The allocation of available financial resources to
housing by this systam was also recognized to be  inequitable, as the State
support  was  not  targeted  accurately  on the basis  of  financial  need.
7  During the 1970s  r  the State Development  ik  was formed  with the task of
financing large, centrally managed  investment projects influencing the wasic
structure of the national economy, and the Ceitral-European International Bank-
-an off-shore bank with foreign participation was established.  In the early
'980s,  some 5 specialized financial  institutions  were set  up, dealing with small
ventures, leasing, etc.
8  With social ownership of the means of production, equity finance is the
exclusive privilege of the state.9
that  affect  the  intermediation  of  f.nancial  f'.ows  and  change  in the  framework
of incentives  that enterprises  and households  face  in financial  decision  making.
will  have  to  occur.  In  this  section  we  present  the  key  developments  that
characterized  the  actual  process  of  financial  reform  in HungaLy
In early  1987,  a two-tier  banking  system  was  established.  As of January
of that  year,  the monopoly  of the National  Bank  of Hungary  (NBH) e::isting sinc4
the  late  1940e  was  abolished.  The  credit  functions  of NBH were  separated  from
its central  banking  operations,  and three  new full-service  commercial  banks were
established.9  This  separation  was  crucial  to permit  an unambiguous  distinction
between  macroeconomic  control  and  management  to be carried  on  by  the  monetary
autho-ity--and  business  activity--to  be  carried  on  by  the  commercial  banks.
Moreover  it wds  a pre-requisite  to enable  the monetary  authority  to assume  its
9 Note  that  this  process  began  in 1986  as  the  .utonomy of the  two  credit
sections  of  NBH  was  progressively  increased.  i:,e  credit  sections  maintained
separate  balance  sheets  from  April  1986,  their  costs  were  computed  separately
from those  of the  'central  bankin?  part  of NBH,  and working  groups  were  set up
to divide  the loan portfolio  .nd other  assets  and liabilities  of NBH.  On  ianuary
1,  1987,  the  credit  secticns  were  converted  formally  into  two  commercial  banks
(the  Commercial  and  Credit  Bank  (CCB),  and  the  Hungarian  Credit  Barik (HCB)).
A  third  bank,  the  Budapest  Bank  (BB),  was  formed  at  the  same  time  from  a
con,bination of the  commercial  banking  wing  of the  State  Development  Bank,  the
Credit  Bank  of Budapest  (a subsidiary  of NBH),  and  the  Pest  County  directorate
of NBH.  Apart  from these three  banks,  the Foreign Trade  Bank  (a 100% Government-
owned  institution)  continued  to  exist  largely  as  before,  without  L'atiches,  and
a  fifth  commercial  bank,  the  General  Banking  and  Trust  Company  was  given
authorization  to become  a full service commercial  bank. The SDB was reconstituted
as  the  State  Cevelopment  Institute,  responsible  for  the  channeling  of  budget
funds  for  investment  and  refinancing  for  priority  projects  to  the  enterprise
sector.
The  three  new  banks  were  allocated  loan  accounts  from  the NBH  portfolio.
The  division  of the portfolio  was  intended  to achieve  a rough  balance  at least
between  the first two banks.  The banks were  set up as joint stock  companies,  with
about 80%  of their  capital  owned  by the State  and the  remainder  by enterprises.
Today  the  State's  shara  has decreased  to about  50%.10
primary  responsibilities,  and to force the banks to  become  profit-oriented  units,
subject  to business  venture. 10
commercial  banks  became  free  to  determine  the  Interest  rates  on deposits
by  and  loans  to  enterprises  (alt'ougn  given  the  stage  of  limited  competition
these  rates  closely  foilowed  the  structu-e  of  interest  rate  cn  transactions
between  the  commercial  banks  and  NBH).  A  State  Ban.k  u,-ervisory  Agency  was
established  within  the Finance  Ministry.  As of January  1989, an explicit  process
of  integration  of  the  enterprise  and  the  household  hanKirig sectur6  was  begun.
Both  the  commercial  banks  and  savings  institutions  are  now  free  to  engage  in
financial  transactions  with  both  households  and  enterprises.) 2 Clients  are
allowed  to choose  among  banks.  Rates  for  housing  loans  approach  market  rates;
although  significant  sutsidies  still exist,  these  come  directly  from the central
budget.
In the  area  of  r,;unetary  and  credit  policies  the  NBH  began  to  resort  to
indirect  ways  to  conduct  monetary  managemer.t  and  to  contribute  to  central
government  financing  needs.  It has beei  isi,  ch!n.rge3  in the  irterestt  rate  'evel
on refinancing  credits  o affect  credit  expansion.  .L intrcduceJ  treasury  bills
to  finance  an  increasing  part  of the  budget  deficlt  throug'. tapping  the  money
10
Bokros,  'The  Conditions  of thp Development  of  i:sinesal.ke  Behavior
in a Two-Tier  Banking  System.  An  'Ex  Ante,  Evaiuaticr- cf  ,he t'ur,garian  Banking
Reform',  Acta  Oeconomica,  Volume  38  (1-2',  1987.
11  In  1938  commerciaL  banks  were  permitted  to  sell  bonds  to  households,
which  constituted  a first step toward  the integrator.  of enterprise  and household
banking.
12  Ceilings  apply  to  interest  rates  on housenoid  depcsits,  however,  are
subject  to a 100  percent  reserve  requirement  during  two rr,cnths.  Also,  as of mid
1989  the  following  rate  ceilings  applied  in  the  household  marKet:  (i)  19.5
percent  for  housing  loans;  (ii)  25  percent  for  non-ho-using  loans;  liii)  18
percent  for  deposits  with  a  r  . ur ty  of  less  than  I  year,  and  20  percen:  for
deposits  with  a maturity  of bet.;een . a.od  3 years.11
market,  with  the  bills  being  sold  through  an  auctioning  procedure13 ,  and
introduced  open  market  operations.
The  state  stopped  guaranteeing  bonds  sold  to  the  public.14  This  (i)
allowed  for the  integration  of the bond markets  for enterprises,  and households,
which  up to January  1988  had developed  separately  on the  basis  of the  required
state  guarantee  for  the  households,  (ii)  e  inated  the  implicit  system  for
rationing  the supply  of  household  bonds,  which  had created  excess  demand  on this
market,  and  (iii)  permitted  bond  financing  to  develop  according  to the  credit-
worthiness  of the  issuing  company.
Other  recent  developments  include:  (i)  a  new  Law  of  Association  that
permits  individuals  to  form  limited  liability  and  joint  stock  companies  and  to
15 hold  negotiable  shares  in  joint  stock  companies;  (ii)  enterprises,  to promote
c_oetition  in  the banking  system,  are  allowed  to  open  checking  accounts  in more
than  cne  bank;  (iii)  a  new  tax  code,  to promote  long-term  financial  savings
through  private  financial  intermediaries,  that  establishes  a  tax  credit  for
individuals  contrLbutcnris  to  private  pension  savings  accounts;16  (iv)  a new
-_mpany profit  tax  law,  to  promote  financial  discipline  and  profit  maximizing
behavior  in the  enterprise  sector,  that  introduces  a  unified  corporate  profit
tax  which  aims  to  ensure  a  uniform  profit  tax  framework  for  all  enterprises,
regardless  of  their  legal  structure  or  size;  (v)  a  law  of  enterprise
13  As of May  1989  the  yield  on 90-day  bills  auctioned  was  18.4%.
14  Suclh  guarantee  remains  only  for treasury  bills.
15 In  a  related  step,  a  new  Law  on  Foreign  Investment  was  enacted  in
December  1988,  which  established  a  modern  legal  framework  for  foreign
participation in Hungarian enterprises.
16 The social security  system has  been separated  from the state  budget, and
the basis of its independence is being gradually established; however, there
are still no private pension funds.12
transformation, approved in  June 1989,  that  enables state  enterprises to convert
themselves into joint stock companies; and (vi)  a new Securities Market Law that
is under preparation and is expected to be enacted later in 1989.  The law will
cover  the  establishment  of a  securities  supervisory  body,  a stock  exchange,  rules
for trading, information disclosure requirements, and specific aspects in the
area of investors protection such as those related to insider trading.
By  early 1989  the number  of financial  intermediaries (excluding  the  savings
cooperatives) had increased from 8 in 1983 to 2717:  four banks had  foreign
participation, 18 and three brokerage houses had begun operations.  The types of
financial services and products that banks could offer were almost unlimited. 19
The securities  market capitalization  had  grown  essentially from  zero in  the early
1980s,  to  approximately  Ft  120  billion  (equivalent to  S2.3  billion),  an
impressive growth even though the figure is still small compared with the size
of the total domestic credit granted by the financial sector, of approximately
Ft 1200 billion. 20 An International Training Center for Bankers, formed as a
joint venture  between the  Hungarian banks and the  Centre  Internationale de
17  One  development  financial  institution,  18  commercial  banks,  4
specialized financial intermediaries, and 4 insurance companies.
18  Citibank and Unicbank deal in both foreign and local currencies.  The
Central-European International Bank, Ltd. (CEIB) is an off-shore bank, and the
Central European Creditbank is its subsidiary that has been set up to deal in
domestic currency.
19 Significant restrictions  were found  only in  the area of foreign  exchange
transactions carried  by domestic banks,  which currently can  operate only in that
market with the central bank and exclusively on behalf of their clients.  Note
further that banks are still not allowed to borrow directly from abroad.
20  Data on the ratio of long-term debt securities and equities to total
assets of deposit banks  for selected countries are  as follows: the Federal
Republic of Germany 0.75, Japan 0.70, the United States 1.40, Chile 0.ec, Korea
0.20, Thailand 0.30, Hungary 0.14.13
Formation  de la  Profession  Bancaire  de France,  started  operation at  the  beginning
of 1989.
IV. An Assessment of the Financial Reforms
Assessing  the  reform  process  taking  place in  the  Hungarian financial  sector
would  require  analyzing  the  success  of  the  reforms  already  introduced  in
achieving their intended objectives  . considering the necessary adjustments
needed for the continuation of such reforms.
It is too soon to evaluate quantitatively how much the financial reforms
have contributed to increasing savings, in general, and financial savings, in
particular,  and  to  channeling  them more  efficiently.  Clearly,  changes  in
financial  behavior cannot be expected to occur overnight.  In  what concerns the
availability  of  instruments to  channel  surplus  funds  toward  the  financial
markets, new securities have  been progressively introduced.  In  early 1990  there
were already about 350 different  bond issues,  treasury  bills of different short-
term maturities 2l, CDs, and even some 80 different shares.22  In the last two
years, household financial assets, however, have not increased substantially in
absolute terms and have decreased as a percentage of GDP  (see  Table 1 and Chart
1).  One reason for this is that, in 1987, interest rates on  household deposits
stili monopolized  by  NSB  and the  associated cooperatives  were  increasingly
negative in real terms  (Table 2), which had a depressing effect on household
savings even when there was a partial shift toward the bond market  (mainly
21  Three,  six,  and  twelve  months.
22  Of these, about 11 are banks, which were established as joint stock
companies upon the reorganization of the banking system in 1987, another 10 are
new  companies created  upon  the breakup  of  one state-owned  conglomerate,  a handful
are companies  that  have retained their original pre-war  structure, and the
remaining are new companies established to take advantage of the new Law of
Association.14
enterprise  bonds  sold  by  banks).23 That  the  rapid  deterioration  of  yields  in
real terme seems to be indeed associated with the fall in household financial
holdings can  be seen from  Chart 2 (for  total financial  assets)  and Chart 3 (total
financial  assets  excluding  currency).
As  far as obtaining  an improvement in the efficiency of the allocation  of
resources, however, there is still not clear evidence of any major increase in
competition  among  banks  or  of  a  large  realignment  in  portfolio  composition.
Credit  continues  to be  largely  allocated  to the  enterprises  that  accounted  for
the  largest  share of the  pre-reform  portfolio.  The  issues  in this  area  are many
and  intertwined.  To a large extent,  stagnant  if not worsening  portfolio  quality
and  composition  are  a result  of the  lack of  incentives  for the  financial  inter-
:red.aries to recognize  losses  h)ciden  in the  loan portfolic--a  problem  frequently
found  _rn  Westerr. economies.  Staff  rerruneratiocn  schemes  tied  to  book  profits,
and  lack  of  satisfactory  acccinting  and  auditing  standards  clearly  worsen  the
prcblem.  Slcw  prcgress  in dealing  with  problem  lcans  is  also  undoubtedly  a
or.sequence of the  significantly  close  links  a.mor.g  borrowers,  bank  boards,  and
sha-ehlcders.  The  adverse  conseq,.en-es  of  such  a  situation  cannot  be
overemphasized.  With  stagnating  portfolios,  and  under  a restrictive  monetary
policy  needed  to pursue  internal  balance,  any increase  in credit  is automatically
allccated  to  non-performing  borrowers--which,  directly  on  indirectly,  control
the  lending  institutions.  The burden  of tight monetary  policy  on the enterprise
sector  is born  mainly  by the efficient,  viable  enterprises  which  are crowded  out
of  the  credit  markets.  Supply  response  is  delayed  if  not  paralyzed.  In
parallel,  increases  in net domestic  credit  to non-performing  enterprises  become
23  Clearly, the decline in real income may also have adversely affected
household  savings.15
purely  inflationary,  as credit  fuels growth  in monetary  liabilities  not matched
by growth  in real  assets.
Improvement  in credit  allocation  requires,  additionally,  new  management
policies  and  procedures  that  effectively  substitute  the  old  ways  of  the
centralized  system.  Essential  within  such  program  is the  adoption  of adequate
credit  evaluation  and  loan  follow-up  processes  that  allow  for  the  ex  ante
identification  of  the  risks  implicit  in  each  operation,  and  the  ongoing
monitoring  of  the borrower's  financial  condition  and  repayment  capacity.
In  the  area  of  macro-financial  management  it  is  important  to  establish
whether  as a consequence  of the  ongoing  reforms  the  central  monetary  authority
has enhanced  its control  over  the outstanding  stock  of money  in the economy  and
has  strengthened  its  ability  to  affect  short-term  variations  in  that  stock.
Among  others  this  will  depend  on the  availability  of a diversified  enough  menu
of instruments  available  for monetary  management  and  for affecting  the  economic
behavior  of the public.
Effective  monetary  control  can only be achieved  to the extent  that economic
agents  outside  the government,  particularly  banks and enterprises,  operate  under
binding  credit  constraints  both  in terms of quantity  and prices  (interest  rates).
It  is  apparent,  however  that  despite  advances  in  this  respect,  financial
discipline  has  yet to be fully  imposed.  For example,  though  the  Bankruptcy  Law
was enacted  in 1986,  so far it has basically  been  applied  to small  firms  and not
to  large  state enterprises.  This  again  is in part  a result  of the  significance
of  insiders'  lending  in the  Hungarian  banking  system,  where  frequently  banks'
shareholders  turn  out  to  be  the  non-creditworthy  debtors.  Also,  with  many
enterprises  bordering  bankruptcy  due to liquidity  problems  and permanent  losses,16
leading economic  institutions have undoubtedly  feared the  social  impact of
regula.r  bankruptcy processes. 24'25
It is still unclear if both  banks and nonfinancial enterprises function
under the principle that loans must be serviced and, particularly, that they
should be repaid at maturity because no automatic rollcvers will take place.
But  without the hardening  of the budget/credit constraint  of the  major operators
in the financial market  it will be difficult,  if not  impossible, to attain
meaningful monetary control.
Moreover,  a  soft  credit  constraint  is  usually  coupled  with  a  weak
accountability  of  managers  for  their  financial  decisions.  This  clearly
contributes  to the problem identified  above  of lack  of incentives  to improve  the
composition of the portfolio of the financial institutions.  Here again it is
evident that  part  of the  difficulties and problems  are unavoidable  at  the
beginning of such a drastic reform process.  In the short run it is not only
difficult Lo change attitudes, but also there are major practical limitations
in terms of the availability of physical and human resources needed to support
an up-to-date efficient financial system.
Of  utmost importance in the process of hardening the financial budget
constraint is the true autonomy of the managers of financial institutions vis-
a-vis  the centers  of  political  power,  and  vis-a-vis  their  borrowers,  which should
also  acquire  genuine autonomy  in  their  decision  making  process.  Clearly, as long
as a few borrowers continue to account for large shares of the capital of the
24  Marton Tardos, The Hungarian Banking Reform, Financial Research Ltd.
Budapest.
25 The authorities  have  often complained about  the fact  that the banks have
not initiated bankruptcy procedures.  However, the same criticism  could be
applied to the  State, which, as an owner, is also authorized by the  law to
initiate such procedures.17
institutions,  genuine  autonomy  of  bank  managers  vis-a-vis  their  clients is  hardly
attainable.  Also,  the  financial  institutions themselves  must  be  enforced
financial discipline, which (i) has clear implications for how the rediscount
mechanism should  work and (ii)  requires that the supervisory authority be given
all the power to impose corrective measures whenever necessary.  If business
decisions  are made  exclusively  on  the basis  of  the  Government's  announced
expectations  about  the  institutions'  behavior,  or  on  the  basis  of  the
expectations the Government is perceived to have, many of the benefits of a
decentralized financial system  will never surface.  The problem of lack of true
autonomy may  come  up  both  in the  large  cities,  specially vis-a-vis  large
government enterprises, or at the regional level, where branch managers may
experience  a similar implicit  lack  of control  owing  to  the very influential  local
political presence.26
With respect to the menu of instruments available for monetary control,
the  main concern  has to  do  with the  existence  of short-term financial  assets  that
can be purchased  and sold  easily and without  large transaction  costs.  As
mentioned above, the authorities have  begun to issue  short-term treasury bills,
which were very well received by the public and commercial banks.  However, the
total amount is still minimal  (Ft. S billion or about  1.5% of Ml, which  is
clearly  insufficient  to  conduct  meaningful  open  market  operations),  the  secondary
market is at an embryonic stage of development, and its  dynamic characteristics
are still  to be assessed.  So far, central  monetary control  mechanisms have been
refinancing credit ceilings, upper limits on  the interest rates on household
26  Note that this has some implications for bank branch policy, at least
during the initial stages of the reform. In fact, it may be recommendable that
branch autonomy vis-a-vis headquarters  be curtailed as a way to break away from
regional political leadership.18
deposits (in banks other than the NSB), and compulsory reserve requirements;
credit ceilings are bank-spezific (related  to their size).  C'larly, the heavy
use of this type of instruments, which although potentially effective in the
short-term, are  inefficient compared with  indirect controls  implemented for
example through open market operat.ons, reveals the need for further progress
in the area of monetary management.
In the area of monetary macroeconomic management, the effectiveness of
monetary policy is largely crnditioned by the presence of a stable demand for
real money balances.  A crude estimation (Table  3) points out that such demand
is clearly responsive to economic activity (with  elasticities close to unity as
expected) but the negative correl,.tion  with the rate of  inflation, although
apparent, cannot be definitively established.
V.  Concluding Remarks
Within  the  new  economic  system  emerging in  Hungary, following  the  extensive
reforms of the last two decades, financial policy ceases to play a passive role
merely supporting  the achievement  of  physical  production  targets  of a  centralized
plan and becomes a crucial indirect lever for managing macroeconomic policies
as well as for achieving a better and more efficient allocation of resources.
In order to reach these objectives a thorough reform of the  financia.
sector is required, much of which is indeed underway.  We have attempted here
to identify the main tasks and targeLs of the financial reform, as well as to
assess its achievements, in the context of an economy which is restruccuring
toward a more market-oriented system, and in which economic agents have more
financial  resources  at  their  disposal  and  are  becoming  increasingly  more
responsible for the consequences of their financial decisions.19
The first  steps  of the  Hungarian financial  reform are clearly in  the right
direction and given the short time elapsed they have been succassful.  Progrees
has taken place not only in form but in substance.  However, changes in macro-
financial  indicators  are  still  of  little  significance,  indicating  that
administrative and  technical obstacles are still in the  way and that a  deepening
of supporting measures is required.
Among those,  four aspects deserve high priority.  The  ability of  the
monetary authority to conduct munetary policy must be enhanced.  This requires,
for example, the development of an interbank money market to deal both with
shifting liquidity needs and with more lasting  differences between deposit and
loan  growth  at individual  instituticns. Interbank  markets  contribute  to  monetary
control through making liquidity conditions more homogeneous across different
financial  institutions, and  ensuring that  the results  of measures adopted  by the
monetary authority are not distorted due to an uneven distribution of excess
reserves across those institutions.27  Additionally, enhancing the ability of
the monetary autho  ty to conduct its policies requires the up-grading of the
monitoring and forecasting capabilities; in particular,  the use of  indirect
instruments  requires  the  authorities  to  make frequent  decisions in  terms of  their
participation  in the  market,  and rnake  it mandatory  that  policy-makers are
continuously and fully informed about market developments.  A second aspect is
the improvement of the operating and, most important, the financial condition
of the existing  financial intermediaries.  Third, healthy competition among
financial  intermediaries  should  be  encouraged.  Last  but  not  least,  a
27 Up to the present, the interbank  market in Hungary is being used mainly
to fun,1  lending operations rather than to manage reserves and cash flows.  One
of the impediments to the development of a very short-term and overnight market
has undoubtedly been the difficulties in the process of clearing of interbank
transactions.  The authorities are currently addressing this issue.20
satisfactory prudential  regulatory  framework must  be  established,  that,  in
particular, does not discriminate against the development of the securities
markets.21
TABLE I
HOUSEHOLD  FIWANCIAL  INDICATORS
..............................
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
............................................  ........................................................................................................
In billions  of Forints
1.  Currency  76.0  80.0  88.2  98.3  110.0  122.7  144.3  152.0
2.  Demand  and  Time  Deposits  '53.7 167.6  187.0  206.6  229.0  257.7  268.2  286.7
3.  Saving  Notes  6.4  8.2  10.1  12.8  15.1  17.8  18.4  19.5
4.  gonds  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.9  2.7  6.8  12.0  0.2
5.  COs  0.o  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.6
6. Total  Househotd  Financial  Assets  236.1 255.8 285.4 318.6 356.8  405.0 442.9 465.0
7.  Total  FinanciaL  Assets  378.4 406.7 426.4 479.8 520.9  572.0 474.7 '64.'
GOP  780.0  847.9  896.4 978.5  1033.6  1087.8  1226.9  1400.6
As  X  of  GOP
1.  Currency  9.7  9.4  9.8  10.0  10.6  11.3  11.8  10.9
2. Demand  and  Time  Deposits  19.7  19.8  20.9  21.1  22.2  23.7  21.9  20.5
( 1  + 2 )  29.4  29.2  30.7  31.2  32.8  35.0  33.6  31.3
3. Saving  Notes  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.3  1.5  1.6  1.5  1.4
4. Bonds  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.6  1.0  0.0
5. Cos  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5
(  3 + 4  +  5  0.!  1.0  1.1  1.4  1.7  2.3  2.5  1.9
6.  TotaL  Housefotd  F;nancial  Assets  30.3  30.2  31.8  32.6  34.5  37.2  36.1  33.2
....  . . . . . . . ...............................................................................
Source: National  Bank  of Hungary,  CentraL  Statistical  Office  pubLic4tions,
and own estimates.22
TABLE 2
Nominal and Real Interest Rates
'ear  Average nominal Interest  Real 'nterest  Rate 2
on Deposits
1980  4,54  -4.6
1981  4.58  0
1982  4.61  -2.3
'?83  4.72  -2.6
198"  5.04  3.3
1.985  4.92  -2.1
.386  5.06  -0.2
.987  6.30  -2.3
?88  !0.20  5
-Source:  eorLd Bank Staff estlmates.
2Deflated  bv  th.e  C?1.23
AULE  3
Money  Demand  Estimates  (Ml1
Ouarterlv  Data  1981-1988
Constant  In Y  vT  Tt-  Mlt.  R1/DW
1.664  0.903  -0.617  0.230
(0.45)  (2.91)  (1 02)  1.78
-0.175  0.719  -1.337  0.327  0.281.
(0.09)  (2.16)  (1.69)  (1.39)  2.10'
1.256  0.937  -0.566  0.226
(0.33)  (2.91)  (0.92)  2.22
1.217  0.911  -0.542  0.028  0.227
(0.31)  (2.45)  (0.84)  (0.14)  2.26'
Notes:
t- values  are  in parentheses.
.h  values  for equations  including  the lagged dependent  variable  cannot
be  calculated  since  formula  produces  an imaginary  result.
Ml  =  Money  as  in  IFS,  deflated  by CPI.  In  log terms.
Mlt.i  - Ml  lagged  one  quarter.
Y  =  four quarter  moving  average  of quarterly  production  estimates
deflated  by CPI.
rT  =  ln CPIt-ln  CPI,. 1.
Vt.  =  IT  lagged  one  quarter.(IIAR.I  I
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